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A GUIDE TO COST JUSTIFICATION:
"CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION"
by
JOHN E. MURRAY, JR.*
Sometimes a seller charges different prices for goods of the same
grades and quality even in the same trade area. When the sales relate
to interstate commerce Robinson-Patman hangs over him. But under
Section 2(a) of the Act' "cost justification" is a valid defense. The seller
attempts to show that his price differentials are no greater or less than
his cost differentials. If he is successful in establishing the cost defense,
the seller will escape a Federal Trade Commission cease-and-desist order
or a private treble damage verdict.
There are many writings suggesting that the possibilities of success
in establishing the cost defense are remote since the defense is practically
"impossible,"2 or it "is available only to the wealthy, the resourceful and
the tireless,"' or it is "largely illusory."' In one of its rare opportunities
to evaluate the cost proviso, the United States Supreme Court stated:
"We have been invited to consider in this connection some of the intricacies
inherent in the attempt to show costs in a Robinson-Patman proceeding. The
elusiveness of cost data, which apparently cannot be obtained from ordinary
business records, is reflected in proceedings against sellers. Such proceedings
make us aware of how difficult these problems are, but this record happily
does not require us to examine cost problems in detail. It is sufficient to
note that, whenever costs have been in issue, the Commission has not been
content with accounting estimates; a study seems to be required, involving
Asst. Professor of Law, School of Law, Duquesne University, member of the Wiscon-
sin bar and a graduate of the School of Law of The Catholic University of America.
149 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. S 13(a) (1952).
2 Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-
Patman, 60 YALE L. J. 929, 963 (1951); five years later, Mr. Rowe retreated to depicting
the defense as, ". . . an expensive gamble at best," Rowe, Price Differentials and Product
Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L. J. 1, 23 (1956).
3 Austern, Tabula in Nauragio-Administrative Style, Some Observations on the Rob-
inson-Patman Act, CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN SYMPOSIUM, 105, 115 (1953).
4 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAwS, 171 (1955); see also, concurring opinion of Chairman Howrey in
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 51 F. T. C. 282, 290 (1954).
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perhaps stop-watch studies of time spent by some personnel such as salesmen
and truck drivers, numerical counts of invoices or bills and in some instances
of the number of items or entries on such records, or other such quantitative
measurement of the operation of a business."
Even in its rather superficial analysis of the problems of cost justifi-
cation, the Court managed to pinpoint the crucial factor in the attempt to
establish the defense, to wit, the difficulties involved in preparation.
Implicit in the Court's concept of the difficulties of cost justification is
that the preparation of the cost defense requires a rather curious mixture
of law, accountancy, market analysis, statistics and, perhaps, time-and-
motion study. One writer suggests that when a respondent seeks to
utilize the cost defense, he must, of necessity, engage in "A trial by the
ordeal of cost accountancy."' The costs which may be shown by a
respondent to justify price differentials are limited to those which flow
from the different methods of sale and delivery or different quantities sold.
cost difference . . . must have) its origin in:
(1) A different method by which one order was sold, or
(2) A different method by which it was delivered, or from
(3) Savings in manufacturing, selling, and delivering resulting from a differ-
ence in quantity sold or delivered, or
(4) Any combination of these three." 7
Since there must be a relation between the costs to be included and
the methods or quantities of sale or delivery, is this not really another
way of saying that the cost defense is relegated to justifying distribution
costs, or generally, ". . . all costs incurred after the goods have been
made available for sale?" 8 The answer is, virtually, yes. In the termin-
ology of the accountant, we are usually dealing with those expenses
which follow cost of goods sold and gross profit on the profit and loss
statement. The single exception occurs when manufacturing is charac-
terized as "special order" or "job shop" production, i. e., the order is
placed before production commences perhaps necessitating the use of
new dies or machine adjustments. In this situation, these might be fixed
expenses which can be traced to a particular customer and tend to
increase or decrease as the customer's purchases decrease or increase.
The normal situation, however, is that of production for inventory, i. e.,
5 Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 346 U. S. 61, 68 (1952).
6 Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 321, 323 (1937).
7ZORN & FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS (1937), quoted in
BACKMAN, (ED.), PRICE PRACTICES AND PRICE POLICIES 287, 288 (1953).8 LONGMAN & SCHIFF, PRACTICAL DISTRIBUTION COST ANALYSIS 69 (1955).
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everything is produced for the same pile and orders are filled from that
pile. Here, there is no manufacturing economy in filling one order as
contrasted with filling another order. Hence, the cost justification defense
is concerned with distribution costs except in those rare instances when
"special order" or "job shop" production is the characteristic of the busi-
ness charged with price discrimination.!
If manufacturing costs were exclusively considered instead of distri-
bution costs, the task of establishing the defense would be greatly sim-
plified. This is because, "There is considerable literature on the subject
of manufacturing cost accounting,"' since it has been the tendency of
management to place great emphasis on the economies obtainable
through production cost control. Production cost accounting has devel-
oped rapidly so that, at the present time, it is a well-defined body of
knowledge. In the distribution area, marketing research has also devel-
oped rapidly in recent years but ". . . the cost control aspect has been
deemphasized."" The market analysts have been occupied with other
phases of marketing the product such as motivation analysis in order to
determine what makes the consumer buy.12 Thus, the tool which the
respondent must use in establishing cost justification is a rather crude
instrument.
To facilitate the use of the cost defense by respondents and the
administration of the defense by the Commission, the FTC has initiated
the preparation of two guides in this area. The first guide was promul-
gated in 1941 and is, at the present time, out of print." The most recent
"unofficial"'" effort initiated by the Commission is the Advisory Com-
mittee Report on Cost Justification to the Federal Trade Commission.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the Advisory Committee Report
in order to ascertain whether or not it affords substantial assistance to a
respondent who seeks to vindicate price differentials by the utilization of
the cost defense.
9 See, Freer, Accounting Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 65 J. OF ACCOUNT-
ANCY 4 80 (1938).
10 EISNER, PROFIT ANALYSIS DISTRIBUTION COSTS AND WORKING PAPERS 1 (1953).
"1 Op. cit. supra., n. 8.
"2 See, PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957).
IS CASE STUDIES IN DISTRIBUTION COST ACCOUNTING FOR MANUFACTURING AND
WHOLESALING, H. R. Doc. No. 287, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); the "Case Studies" are
available, however, in many libraries.
14 Neither of the two guides are an official pronouncement by the FTC on cost justifi-
cation.
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Purpose and Scope of Report15
"The Advisory Committee will ascertain whether it is feasible for the Federal
Trade Commission to develop standards of proof and procedures for cost
accounting which can be adopted by the Commission as guides to business
enterprises."
When the announcement of the formation of the Advisory Com-
mittee was made, prognostications of the results of the Committee's
efforts ranged from a rehash of general principles to a detailed manual
which would be a panacea for cost justification purposes. The average
businessman was probably ". . . hoping that the Committee would come
up with a practical formula which would enable him to make approxi-
mate judgments respecting the relations between his cost and price dif-
ferences."1 Among lawyers and accountants whose clients were involved
in cost justification matters, there were many who felt that the Advisory
Committee, with its excellent staff,1" would produce a revealing docu-
ment which would materially assist them in their endeavors and, perhaps,
miraculously solve some of the issues which had little or no precedent
in the recorded cases. Before the completion of the Report, the Chairman
of the Advisory Committee called the "miraculous" label a fallacy:
"'... the committee has not felt that it is called upon to perform miracles.
Two miracles seem sometimes to be expected. One is the concoction of a
practicable cost accounting system which will give a definitive Robinson-
Patman answer at any time by looking at the right page in the ledger. The
second is an invention whereby a cost defense may be made costless and easy.
Neither miracle will come out of the committee deliberations."' s
The Chairman further indicated that Robinson-Patman cost account-
ing was, itself, a miracle: "While it is perhaps hyperbole to call a Robin-
15 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COST JUSTIFICATION REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, 1-2 (1956); hereinafter referred to as "Report." The Report is popularly
known as the "Taggart Report" in honor of the Chairman of the Advisory Committee,
Professor Herbert F. Taggart.
16 Daniel, Cost Report is Held No Practical Aid in R-P Costing Matters, TRADE PRAc-
TICE BULLETIN (1956).
17 The members of the Advisory Committee were: H. T. McAnly, Ernst & Ernst,
accountants, Cleveland, Ohio; Otto F. Taylor, 0. F. Taylor & Co., New York, N. Y.; Albert
F. Sawyer, Sawyer & Marion, New York, N. Y. and Washington, D. C. (Mr. Sawyer was
the only attorney on the Advisory Committee); Alvin R. Jennings, Lybrad, Ross Bros. &
Montgomery, accountants, New York, N. Y.; C. R. Fay, accountant, Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.; E. W. Kelley, Macy's, Kansas City, Mo.; Herbert F. Taggart (Chair-
man), Professor of Accounting, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
18 Taggart, Problems of the Cost Justification Committee, ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM,
Section on Antitrust Law of the New York State Bar Association, 30 (1955).
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son-Patman cost accounting system a miracle-and hence to imply
impossibility-a miracle it remains for practical purposes."'"
This language points up the underlying philosophy of the Advisory
Committee: a detailed manual of Robinson-Patman cost accounting is
impossible and, therefore, only generalized principles can be enunciated.
Diametrically opposed to this philosophy is that of Mr. William War-
mack who, unfortunately, was not a member of the Advisory Committee."
Mr. Warmack, whose reputation in the cost defense area places him on
an equal plane with Professor Taggart," suggests that "... there is nothing
mysterious or miraculous about. . ." Robinson-Patman cost accounting."
Another aspect of the Report to be lamented is the absence of any minority
views which clearly existed.22 Thus, the philosophy of Chairman Taggart
which permeates the Report, the absence of personnel with different
views such as Mr. Warmack from the Committee and the absence of
dissenting opinions which leads to broad compromises, underlie the basic
approach which the Advisory Committee took in the preparation of
the Report.
19 Ibid.
20 It is possible that Mr. Warmack precluded himself from becoming a member of the
Advisory Committee by suggesting to former Chairman Howrey of the FTC and subsequently
to Professor Taggart (via telephone) that he would not consider becoming a member of
the Committee. The question of Mr. Warmack's motivation in this matter arose in Con-
gressional Hearings in which a question also arose as to the propriety of Professor Taggart's
becoming a member of the Advisory Committee when cost material which was partially his
work was pending before the Commission. This was the essence of Mr. Warmack's refusal
(in advance) to become a member of the Committee:1 .* I had cost matters up before the Commission at that very time, and have had
them up before the Commission almost continuously, or off and on, at least. And, it was
just my feeling, Mr. MacIntyre (counsel for the Congressional Committee) that maybe I
should not go down and participate in trying. to establish a measuring factor or a yardstick
with which the Commission would, in turn, measure the costing material I had in before
the Commission or would put in during the time that I would be serving on the Com-
mittee ..." Hearings Before the Select Committee on Small Business, House of Representa-
tives, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Part II, p. 896 (1955).
In all fairness to Professor Taggart and the others, it should be noted that it is not
uncommon for interested parties to serve on such committees and the reason for this is that,
as a practical matter, if such interested people were not on the committees, some of the best
talent would be wasted on matters in which they could conceivably contribute a great deal.
21 Mr. Warmack was a Commission accountant for several years; he has written many
articles in the field; he has been an expert witness and cost consultant for many past
respondents; he is editor and publisher of the Trade Practice Bulletin and the Trade Practice
Annual, in which many articles authored by him have appeared in relation to the cost
defense. His Robinson-Patman costing opinions have been continually accepted and upheld
by the Commission and the courts and they have been cited as authoritative by the United
States Supreme Court.
22 Warmack, Robinson-Patman Costing Not Too Dificult or Expensive, TRADE PRAC-
TICE ANNUAL, (1956).
23 On page 2 of the Report, the statement is clear that minority views have not been
presented; thus, the principles in the Report smack of broad compromises.
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"The Taggart Report performed a service in urging on the Commission a
flexible approach to the defense and in recommending against the adoption
by the Commission of any particular cost accounting system or method of cost
analysis in weighing attempted cost justifications. Having taken this position,
the Taggart Committee could not have been expected to lay any but the most
general guides either for the Commission or for the litigant.24 (Emphasis
added )"
Basic Interpretations of Cost Proviso"5
Section 2(a) of the Act permits a differential in price if the seller
can show that such differentials "make only due allowance for differences
in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers
sold or delivered." Part II of the Report seeks to interpret this statutory
language by analyzing certain key phrases contained therein: (1) "dif-
ferentials in price," (2) "due allowance," (3) "resulting from," and
(4) "differences in the cost of ... delivery."
( 1 ) "differentials in price"
In general, the "price" of a commodity is the consideration or
amount which the buyer pays, but the definition of price depends upon
the intent of the parties. Thus, if one charges $1.00, f. o. b. seller's plant,
or f. o. b. buyer's plant, the price is still $1.00, even though the buyer
pays the freight in one case and the seller in the other. But, if one
charges $1.00, delivered, to one buyer and 90c to a buyer who picks up
the product, there is a price differential and the seller must justify the
10c difference. There are many practices between these extremes where
the seller absorbs part, but not all, of the transportation cost. In such
cases, the price is still the amount the buyer pays for goods, "including as
'goods' whatever transportation the seller may furnish." If the "price,"
as here defined, is different to different buyers, this difference must theh
be justified. "Zone pricing" involves setting prices according to geo-
graphic zones, with uniform prices within a zone, but possibly different
from zone to zone.
The "price" is the amount paid after deducting discounts, allowances
or rebates to which the buyer is entitled in view of the quantity or
methods of his purchases. Thus, with a $10 billing on which the buyer
deducted $1.00 in remitting, or pays the full $10 but receives a $1.00
rebate, the price is $9.00. Such allowances take various forms, follow
various procedures and receive various names ("trade," "functional,"
24 Letter from R. H. Frick, attorney, The Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, Dec. 2, 1958.
2 5 Report, 2.
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"volume," "quantity," "cash," etc.), but in any event the "price" is still
the net amount which the buyer pays. Indirect price concessions such as
varying terms of sale and "service" allowances, must also be considered
in determining net price.
In relation to cash discounts, the example given in the Report is
clear: the price of the commodity is $10 to A and $10 to B, but if A
pays within 10 days, the price to A is $9.80 since A is entitled to a dis-
count of 2 percent. Whether or not A pays within 10 days, the price to
A is still $9.80, constituting a differential of 20 cents which must be
justified. The reason for this is that whether or not A avails himself of
the cash discount, he is entitled to it.
In the Sylvania case, " a controversy arose over cash discounts when
the hearing examiner rejected the respondent's theory that prices should
be compared after cash discounts were deducted. Instead, said the hearing
examiner, gross prices before cash discount should be compared. 7 While
the Report does not mention the Sylvania case, it adopts the theory urged
by the respondent in that proceeding. Since the issue was bypassed on
appeal, quaere, may a respondent rely on the theory suggested by the
Report and proceed to compare prices net of cash discount? The answer
must be in the negative since the Commission staff is bound only by the
conclusions of the Commission and there is no guarantee that the position
it took on a matter which was left unresolved will change, the Report
notwithstanding. Thus, the respondent should ascertain the Commission's
position before comparing any prices. This can be done in informal
negotiations with the Commission staff.
The prices to be compared in a Robinson-Patman proceeding may
be the prices on individual commodities, or where different commodities
are normally grouped together or sold as a "set," the prices of the group
or set may be compared. If the seller markets a line of related products,
the prices of all of these related products may be averaged.
In this respect, the Report is apparently acquiescing in the averaging
26 Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 51 F. T. C. 282 (1954).
27 In 1948, the distributors of Sylvania earned a cash discount on 77 percent of the
dollar volume of goods purchased from the respondent. On the remaining 23 percent, they
chose the deferred payment and, thus, were not given the 2 percent discount. The prices
charged the "favored" buyer, Philco, were net of cash discount on 100 percent of its pur-
chases since its bills were always paid on time. The cost study submitted by Sylvania made
a price comparison net of cash discount between the "favored" buyer, Philco, on the one
hand, and the "nonfavored" distributors on the other, disregarding the 23 percent of the
dollar volume of goods purchased by the distributors on which cash discount was not earned.
The basis for this, argued the respondent, was that cash discounts were uniform and avail-
able to all. The hearing examiner rejected this contention.
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of prices by the respondent in the Sylvania case which was accepted by
the Commission. The Commission allowed the respondent to average
the prices of 600 different types of renewal radio tubes because only the
average price had any competitive significance, whereas the individual
tube prices when compared did not have any competitive significance.
Why? The answer lies in the nature of the product sold by replacement
tube distributors. Economists would characterize the demand for replace-
ment radio tubes as inelastic, i. e., a change in price would bring a less
than proportionate change in the amount of tubes taken by customers.
The distributors of the replacement tubes performed a mechanical sales
function since they could not "push" one type of tube rather than another
type. The demand in this case was not primarily for individual items
and the volume of sales did not depend upon tube price differences.
While individual price differences varied widely from tube to tube, the
Commission felt that there was no competitive significance in this fact
since as to the types of tubes which manifested the greatest price differ-
entials, these were in the least demand. The Commission indicated that
the situation would be different where demand was primarily for indi-
vidual items and not for a whole line of related products and also where
the volume of sales depended on price differences and other similar
competitive factors.
The Report suggests that when a seller attempts to justify average
price differentials, he bears the burden of proof in showing the "reason-
ableness of that method of comparison." In order to ascertain whether or
not the comparison is reasonable, the Report suggests that the seller
should consider three criteria: (1) The degree of similarity of use, i. e.,
the function which the products sold in a related line perform should be
similar. In the case of radio tubes, all of the tubes had a common physical
function though they differed in price, shape, size and composition.
(2) The extent to which different customers or customer classes do in
fact purchase the items or products in the "set" or related line in similar
proportions. In order for a radio tube distributor to be an efficient busi-
nessman, he must carry the entire complement of tubes. (3) The com-
petitive significance, if any, of the lack of uniformity in the price spread
on individual items. This was the principal consideration in the Sylvania
case, to wit, whether price differentials which were greater on some types
of tubes than on other types suggested any competitive significance.
As to these criteria, it is interesting to note that the first two were
violated without any apparent ill effect on the respondent in the Thomp-
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son Products case. 8 Among the related items which were aggregated in
order that their prices could be averaged were valves and tie rods which
differ sharply in function so that the degree of similarity of use criterion
seems to have been violated. In relation to the second criterion, the
extent to which the products in a related line were bought by different
customers or customer classes, the favored customers in the Thompson
case (i. e., those paying the lower prices) were the original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs); the nonfavored customers (i. e., those paying
the higher prices) were the wholesale distributors. All of the distributor
customers bought valves and tie rods; some of the OEM's, however,
bought only valves; others bought only tie rods, and only some of the
OEM's bought both products. In spite of the violation of two of the
three criteria set out in the Report, the Commission accepted the averaging
of commodity prices by the respondent. The only issue relating to "aver-
aging" in that case concerned the attempt by the respondent to average
the costs of serving all of the original equipment manufacturers.
Special problems may arise when goods which differ in minor re-
spects but are, nevertheless, "goods of like grade and quality, 29 are
compared on the basis of price. For example, goods may be packaged
individually for one customer while the same goods may be sold in bulk
to another customer; or, a commodity may be painted for one customer
and not painted for another. If the additional price for the added opera-
tion and/or material is specified in the sales contract or invoice, the
prices to be compared are the stated prices for the basic commodity and
no problem arises. But, if the prices are all-inclusive, i. e., without speci-
fication of the price of the basic commodity, it becomes necessary to
compute a price for the basic commodity. For example, a furniture com-
pany sells chairs which are basically identical but which may differ, at
the option of the buyer, in that the purchaser may purchase them in
either a painted or unpainted condition. Buyer X buys 100 chairs at a
price of $2 each, such chairs being in an unpainted condition. Buyer Y
purchases 100 painted chairs at $2.50 each. If the invoice to buyer Y
specified the price of the unpainted chairs (i. e., the basic commodity),
no problem would arise as to which prices were comparable. If the price
of the unpainted chairs as stated on the invoice to buyer Y were $2 and
28 Thompson Products, Inc., CCH Trade Regulation Reporter (FTC Rulings, Re-
spondents, Trade Rules), S§27,841, p. 36.908 (1959).
29 See, Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Commodities in Commerce: Jurisdictional Cri-
teria Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 67 YALE L. J. 1155 (1958).
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the additional cost of painting 50c, the comparison of prices between
buyers X and Y would show no price differential since they were both
paying $2 for the basic commodity. On the other hand, if the invoice to
buyer Y was all-inclusive, i. e., without specification of the price of the
unpainted chairs, how is the price of the basic commodity determined
so as to compare prices between X and Y? The Report suggests a formula
to be used in this situation:
"... compare the factory costs, either actual or standard ...and make the
assumption that the same rate of gross margin applies to each dollar of cost,
whether for the basic commodity or the added processing ...",0
In the accountant's mind, this formula is reasonable since it is to
be expected that any special finish or processing such as painting the
chair, would carry its own markup. In the invoice to buyer Y, the price
is stated to be $2.50 per chair without specification of the price of the
unpainted chair or the price of the painting process. If it is determined
that the cost of making the chair is $1.00 and the cost of painting is
25c, the $2.50 price contains markups of 100% on the basic commodity
and also on the added processing. Suppose, however, that the seller decides
to provide the painting service at cost, and it costs 50c to paint each
chair. If the cost of making the chair is $1.00 and the cost of painting
is 50c, the application of the formula in the Report will result in a 66
and 2/3rds percent markup on the price to buyer Y of $2.50. As to
buyer X, however, the markup is still 100% (cost = $1.00, price =
$2.00). Thus, X may allege price discrimination and there can be no cost
justification defense. In this respect, the Report has been accused of
allowing a possible incongruity, thereby necessitating a fuller exposition
of the proposal itself." There is, however, in the language of the pro-
posal a possible clue as to why such incongruity would not be permitted.
The formula is prefaced with the phrase, "A satisfactory approach to the
problem is . . ." Thus, the formula is not exclusive- it merely suggests a
possible approach which the Advisory Committee felt would be a satis-
factory one. Yet, since the Report does not consider such an incongruity,
it is probably true that "fuller exposition" is necessary.
(2) The meaning of "due allowance"
The Report considers the phrase "due allowance" as found in the
statutory language to be "[a]t the heart of the cost proviso . . ." The
30 Report, 5.
ai Schniderman, Cost Justification Under the Robinson-Patman Act-The FTC Ad-
visory Committee's Report, 25 U. OF CINN. L. REV., 389, 404 (1956).
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correct interpretation of this phrase is of prime importance since it was
the intent of the legislators who voted the Robinson and Patman bills
into law to allow sellers to pass on to customers the benefit of economies
in manufacturing and distribution. The phrase should not be construed
in every case to require full and complete cost justification of a price
differential. Instead, the phrase should be construed flexibly so as to
require only reasonable allowance for cost differences based on sound
accounting principles and sound pricing principles.
Elsewhere, Professor Taggart indicated that if the businessman can
show a reasonable allowance for cost differences, this is all that he can
be expected to do; in fact, this is the "careful businessman's approach"
to the problem of cost justification. 2
.. . even the most careful businessman makes decisions on the basis of
approximate costs. He is satisfied, and rightly so, with costs computed along
conventional lines and containing considerable elements of judgment. There
are, of course, very sound reasons for this attitude. In the first place, business
decisions are seldom if ever made on the basis of costs. In many cases matters
of relationships with employees, customers, competitors and the general public
outweigh costs as decision-making factors. Thus the necessity of exactitude of
cost data is minimized. " 33 (Emphasis added)
In light of this reasoning, the Report "... approves the position
taken by the Commission in applying a de minimis31 concept to cases
where price differentials are not shown to be completely cost-justified but
where circumstances minimize such failure to the extent that no cor-
rective action is deemed necessary." 5
The first "very sound reason" given by Chairman Taggart in support
of his suggestion that a businessman can be satisfied with only an ap-
proximate knowledge of costs is that "business decisions are seldom if
ever made on the basis of costs." Quaere: should a business decision such
as establishing quantity discount brackets be made on the basis of costs?
There are, of course, sound business reasons why such a decision should
not be made absent a rather detailed knowledge of costs.5 " Moreover,
the very fact that the seller charges different prices is enough to suggest
that if the seller wishes to comply with the law, he should have a rather
detailed knowledge of cost differentials.
32 Op. cit. supra, n. 18 at 32.
33 Ibid.
34 De Minimis Non Curat Lex, the law does not take notice of trifling matters.35 Report, 5.
36 The "business" advantage of cost analysis are the minimizing of costs and thus
maximizing profits.
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As to price discrimination, the standards that have been established
by the business community are not identical with those of the law.
"Certain it is that no legislative enactment in our recent history has been
more widely disregarded by the persons to whom it applies."8 The
Report, when read in conjunction with statements made elsewhere by
the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, is suggesting that the law
should become more flexible not because the law would be better
if it were more flexible but rather because the standards of the
business community would be more consistent with a law that would
be flexible enough to conform to those standards. The fact that "business
decisions are seldom made on the basis of costs" should not mean that
Robinson-Patman decisions should not be made on the basis of costs.
"... the standpoint from which the cost justification for price discrimination
must be judged is the over-all legislative, or public policy and not that of the
producing enterprise. Here other considerations come into play." 8
In its approval of the de minimis rule, the Report suggests that
a primary test to be applied is the relation of the unjustified portion
to the differential itself, not to the higher unit price. "8'  Thus, if the
price of the product to A was $1.00 and the price to B was $1.50, the
price differential would be 50 cents. If the price differential were justified
to the extent of 40c, the Report recommends that the "primary" test to
be applied is the relation of the unjustified portion of the price differential
(10c) to the differential itself (50c) and not to the higher unit price
($1.50). The apparent intention of the Advisory Committee was to
facilitate the application of the de minimis rule. The test suggested
by the Report has not been seen in the recorded cases which have applied
two other tests:
(A) In Minneapolis-Honeywell," U. S. Rubber," and the Sylvania
case,"2 the de minimis principle was applied by relating the unjustified
portion of the price differential to the price of the product and not to the
differential itself, as recommended by the Report.
(B) In the B. F. Goodrich proceeding,"3 counsel for both sides
37 Howrey, Good Faith Meeting of Competition, CCH ANTITRUST SYMPOSIUM, 50
(1957).
88 Fuchs, The Requirement of Exactness in the Justification of Price and Service Differ-
entials Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 30 TEXAS L. Rim. 1, 11 (1951).
8 Report, 5.
40 The Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F. T. C. 351 (1948).
41 The U. S. Rubber Co., 46 F. T. C. 998 (1950).
42 Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 51 F. T. C. 181 (1954).
43The B. F. Goodrich Co., 50 F. T. C. 138 (1954).
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agreed that all price differentials were cost justified with the exception
of one discount bracket applicable to waterproof footwear. The per-
centage of total waterproof footwear sales affected by this one unjustified
bracket amounted to substantially less than of 1 percent. From these
facts, the hearing examiner concluded:
"There can be no public interest .. . in pursuing an inquiry relating to a
discount bracket affecting such an insignificant proportion of respondent's busi-
ness from which no possible substantial injury to competitors could result."44
This result has been called a ". . . substantial development and
extension of the de minimis rule.""5 Here, the unjustified portion of the
price differential was not compared with the differential, nor was it
compared with the price of the product. The significant factor did not
concern the unjustified portion of the differential at all; instead, the
Commission was concerned with the effect on competition that resulted
in allowing or not allowing this discount bracket to go unjustified. Even
if this particular quantity discount were not justified to any degree, it
would not suffice to warrant an issuance of a cease-and-desist order since
the requisite effect on competition was not present. The basis for the
application of the de minimis rule in any case is that a failure of cost
justification is not fatal when such failure will not injure competition or
competitors. In the Thompson Products case, 6 the Commission's refusal
to apply the de minimis rule was accompanied by the explanation that in
the particular industry being considered competition was extremely keen,
margins of profit on individual items were exceedingly small, and even a
2% cash discount allowed by the respondent was very important to the
respondent's distributor customers. Thus, certain unjustified differentials
ranging between 3.07 percent and 6.91 percent were clearly not de
minimis in character. Whether a respondent will be able to avail himself
of the de minimis rule is a matter which the Commission determines being
guided by the difficult concept of injury to competition, considering the
unique and significant elements in the particular adjudication. Perhaps
the unjustified differentials in Thompson Products would have been
considered de minimis had competition in that particular industry been
less keen and/or if the profit margins on individual items had been
substantially greater. What is de minimis in one situation may not be
de minimis in another.
4CCH TRADE REGULATION REPORTER, Vol. I S3506.105.
45 Op. cit. supra., n. 31 at 413.
46 Op. cit. supra., n. 28.
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In light of these facts, the "primary" test of the Report has been
criticized on the basis that the ". . . de minimis principle is a diffuse one,
and ... no 'primary test' should be set up.""
A recent Commission decision extends further support to the sug-
gestion that the principle is a diffuse concept. In Hamburg Brothers, Inc.,
the hearing examiner said:
"Considering the volume of respondent's business with both group I and group
II customers, the price differences in favor of those customers in group I in
those sales which have not been ... justified ...are so small, figured either
on a percentage basis or on a total dollar basis, that they could not substan-
tially lessen, injure, destroy or prevent competition between respondent's
customers." (Emphasis added) 48
(3) The meaning of "resulting from .
The cost proviso permits price differentials based on cost differences
resulting from different methods or quantities" in which such goods are
sold or delivered to different customers. The legislative history clearly
indicates that Congress intended this "resulting from" language to be
broadly interpreted."9 There are many different quantities and methods
of sale and delivery which may give rise to cost differences. These differ-
ing methods and quantities are usually ascertainable upon analysis of the
seller's manufacturing and distribution system. The analysis of differing
methods and quantities of sale and delivery should interpret these terms
in their broadest connotation, giving full effect to all items of cost dif-
ference.
The suggestions of the Report in this section are similar to "canons
of construction" which do not tell the reader a great deal. If the "result-
ing from" language should be broadly interpreted, and perhaps it should
be, does that mean that the interpretation should be more expansive than
it is at the present time? If so, how restrictive is the present interpretation
of the statutory language? Absent references to, recorded cases or, as a
minimum, some examples of what is "broad" interpretation, it is difficult
to draw any conclusions as to what the Advisory Committee intended
to say. The same criticism is applicable to the "differing methods and
quantities" language which terms, according to the Report, should be
interpreted in their "broadest connotation." Without a fuller exposition
than is given in the Report, the lawyer does not know what the Com-
47 Op. cit. supra., n. 31 at 412.4 8 CCH TRADE REGULATION REPORTER, Vol. 3, §27.023 (1958).
41 The Report cites Congressman Utterback at 80 Cong. Rec. 9417 (1936); actually,
the Report cites the page number as 9415 which is, apparently, a misprint.
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mittee intends to suggest in this section.
(4) Delivery cost differences
The Report suggests that when differences can be shown in costs
of delivery, such cost differentials should be permitted to be included in
the summation of cost savings even though no differences in methods or
quantities of sale and delivery exist. For example, if the distance in
delivery is greater to some customers than to others with greater expendi-
tures for delivery for the more distant customers, the cost differentials
should be permitted to be shown in justification of price differentials.
Accounting Proof and Procedures"0
Cost accounting is not and can never become an exact science
because of the inherent element of judgment which must be exercised by
the cost analyst. A cost study requires judgment and opinion and any
rigid approach to cost analysis would require refinements which would
make the cost analysis inordinately expensive. Therefore, the Report
recommends that the FTC take a broad approach in its evaluation of
cost studies; such an approach is indispensable if the equitable solution
of problems arising under the cost proviso is to be attained.
It is impossible to determine whether the Advisory Committee is
recommending that the Commission take a broader approach to cost
study evaluation than it has taken in the past as evidenced by the re-
corded cases, or whether the Commission's approach has been broad
enough in some cases or rigid in others. The Committee suggests that
a more rigid approach (more rigid than some kind of broad approach)
would make cost analysis inordinately expensive. According to William
Warmack, the Commission's present approach in evaluating cost studies
does not require the studies to be refined to the extent that they become
inordinately expensive; instead, Mr. Warmack would suggest that the
expenditure necessary for Robinson-Patman costing should not exceed
that of a salary of a good clerk. According to Mr. Warmack, the "fabu-
lous amounts" which some respondents have paid to have cost informa-
tion developed has been due to the fact that these respondents "took the
law lightly, disregarded it altogether, or, at least, never went to the
trouble of determining with reasonable certainty that their prices were
or were not cost-justified.""
80 Report, 6.
51 Warmack, A Realistic Approach to Robinson-Patman Costing, TRAIE PRACTICE
ANNUAL, 11 (1954); reprinted in 100 Cong. Rec., A5452.
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The Report proceeds to suggest some general principles of proof52
to serve as guides in the preparation and consideration of cost studies in
relation to general principles of proof of an accounting nature. The
Advisory Committee points up the difficulties of presenting a study based
on anticipated costs. While industrial practice bases decisions on antici-
pated costs, the Act requires cost studies to be predicated upon actual or
historical costs. Thus, the Report recommends that studies which are
based on anticipated costs should be of some value if the seller is able
to show that the actual cost variations resulted from operating conditions
beyond the control of the seller or from changes which the seller could
not reasonably anticipate. While this suggestion seems sound, the only
way in which to ascertain its application is through a change in the
statute.
A second general principle of proof found in the Report relates
to cost studies which are made in good faith and in accordance with
acceptable accounting doctrines. Such studies should, according to the
Report, be given "great weight." This apparently intends to suggest that
when a respondent relies upon certain accounting principles, these prin-
ciples should have an evidentiary value superior to an adverse theory of
accounting unless a preponderance of the evidence supports the contention
that the respondent's accounting principles are not sound. Thus, the
adverse theory of accounting should not be sufficient to overthrow the
respondent's method even though the adverse theory would produce
narrower cost differences. While the language of the Report in ex-
pressing this principle has been termed "contradictory,"" it would seem
to be reasonably clear.
As to the extent of cost surveys, the Report states, "The preparation
of unnecessarily exhaustive, time-consuming and expensive cost surveys
should be avoided."" This is obviously a sound suggestion but it omits
the most important element, to wit, how are such exhaustive, time-
consuming and expensive studies to be avoided? Mr. Warmack's sug-
gestion affords the best advice: In order to preclude the unnecessary
expenditure of "fabulous amounts" in order to have cost information
developed subsequent to the issuance of a complaint, compile the data
previous to the issuance of the complaint. This can be done, according to
52 REPORT 7.
53 SCHNIDERMAN, $Upra, n. 31 at pp. 406-407.
54 REPORT 7-8.
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Mr. Warmack, "for the most part, by the company's own personnel at
relatively little extra expense."" Suppose, however, that no data has
been compiled and the complaint has been issued; what is the best pro-
cedure to follow? Professor Taggart, in a subsequent writing, offers some
general precepts:
"... in no case should the problem of cost justification be turned over to the
'second team.' This has been done occasionally, with disastrous consequences.
Cost justification is a problem sufficiently complex to require the best brains
any enterprise can afford. Some of the questions can be answered only by
top company officials, who, however, should supply no answers until they are
sure they perceive the implications. The job is not one for accountants alone.
Highly placed operating personnel must actively take a hand in the proceed-
ings. The lawyer may have to defend the study in Commission proceedings
or in court, so he should know what is in it, how it has been prepared and
why certain techniques were chosen rather than others. The qualified lawyer
can also be of great assistance in planning a study, in determining its scope,
and in directing its method of presentation."'5 6
The Report recommends the continued use of the classification of
customers, orders, commodities and transactions. "What this means is
that it is not necessary to cost-justify each sale transaction or sales to each
individual customer." ' If no customer could be treated as a member
of a class or group, cost studies would be refined to the extent of ascer-
taining the cost of making each individual sale. Such a procedure would
not be practicable. The classification should be logical and reflect actual
differences in the manner or cost of dealing. Care should be taken that
all members of the class are enough alike to make the averaging of their
costs a sound procedure.
The difficulties in the recommendations of the Report in this section
are manifested in the approval of certain classifications of customers in
the American Can Company cases58 by the Chairman of the Advisory
55 WARMACK, supra, n. 51.56 TAGGART, COST JUSTIFICATION 542 (1959).
57 Report, 8.
58 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S. D. Fla. 1949); aff'd,
American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F. 2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951); petition for
rehearing denied, American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 190 F. 2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951);
at this time, appellee's counsel were awarded an additional $5000. Russellville Canning Co.
v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484 (W. D. Ark. 1949); rev'd, American Can Co. v.
Russellville Canning Co., 191 F. 2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951). It is interesting to note that,
"... the American Can Co. after winning its case in the eighth circuit, promptly settled
with the Russellville Canning and paid it $150,000. And that is what kept the case out
of Supreme Court." Hearings Before the Select Committee on Small Business, House of
Representatives, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. Part II, p. 899 (1955). But see, WHITNEY, ANTI-
TRUST POLICIES, Vol. II, 215 (1958).
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Committee, Professor Taggart. The two plaintiffs in the private treble
damage actions, Russellville and Bruce's Juices, were included by the
defendant American Can Co. in the "no discount" classification. Yet,
sales to Russellville ranged to volumes more than 10 times greater than
the average sales to customers in that classification and more than 25
times greater than the sales to half of the customers in the "no discount"
classification. Sales to Bruce's Juices ranged to volumes more than 20
times greater than the average and more than 50 times greater than the
sales to half of the "no discount" customers. Quaere: were Russellville
and Bruce's Juices enough alike the other customers in the "no discount"
class to make the averaging of their costs a sound procedure? The Report
does not give an answer to this problem even though the chairman of
the Advisory Committee testified in the Russellville case to the effect
that he approved the defendant's cost accounting system."9 Professor
Taggart appraises the Can cases as follows: "If the Russellville and
Bruce's Juices decisions were to prevail, cost justification would become
a nullity through sheer weight of the enormous burden of proof, cus-
tomer by customer, and transaction by transaction.""
Thus, the Chairman would suggest that whenever you cannot
classify customers as did American Can, cost justification becomes a
nullity. Yet, American Can's customer classification would seem to be in
square opposition to the rule stated in the Report that the members of a
customer classification must be enough alike to make the averaging of
their costs a sound procedure. Perhaps the majority of the Advisory
Committee did not approve American Can's customer classification; it is
certain, however, that the Chairman approved such classification. Absent
a reference to American Can and other cases involving customer classi-
fication, the Report does not suggest what enough alike means. Instead,
the reader is given a broad "canon of construction" which can mean a
number of different things. The language manifests ambiguity when it
is not related to concrete situations.
The Report recommends the use of sampling techniques in order
to expedite the cost analysis. The type of sample recommended for
Robinson-Patman purposes is the judgmental sample rather than the
59 191 F. 2d 38, 52. (C.A. 8th, 1951).
6OTaggart, Work of the Cost Justification Committee, 1 ANTrRUsT BULL. 585, 589
(1956).
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random or statistical sample. In using the former, the individual making
the sample exercises judgment as to which items or members of a
homogenous group will be used to represent all of the items or members
of the group. In this case, "the competence of the judgment must be
established." The random sample occurs when no judgment or opinion
is exercised by the individual making the sample in choosing representa-
tive items or members of a group. Instead, the choice is dictated by pure
chance. The random sample should be used where feasible because of
its demonstrable lack of bias.
The reader of the Report is not given the solid basis for under-
standing precisely what the Report recommends which could have been
given by the use of three examples of the Commission's treatment of
sampling in the recorded cases. In the Niehoff case, 17 sales orders were
not representative of 10,008 orders. " In the Morton Salt case, the Com-
mission criticized the use of the respondent's Port Huron plant as a repre-
sentative shipping point." On the other hand, U. S. Rubber's selection
of three branch sales offices as representative of all branch sales offices
was acceptable."8 Thus, in this section of the Report, once again there is
no objective correlative on which the Report's recommendations can be
based.
When the Report suggests that random samples should be used
where feasible, it does not suggest any hypothetical situations wherein
such sampling techniques may be feasible. Since the recorded cases do
not demonstrate the use of random (or "pure chance") samples, the
reader is left with a suggestion that requires fuller exposition.
The Report takes the position that "uniform methods and pro-
cedures for Robinson-Patman accounting are precluded" because of the
infinite variations of internal organization, methods of doing business,
availability of accounting and statistical data and other imporiant factors.
Any attempt to lay down detailed procedures for all business enterprises
or otherwise to "strait-jacket" cost justification would be self defeating.
This section of the Report points up a glaring difference between
the Taggart school and the Warmack school. Mr. Warmack would
61C. E. Niehoff & Co., 51 F. T. C. 1114 (1955).
62The Morton Salt Co., 40 F. T. C. 388 (1945).
683 The U. S. Rubber Co., 46 F. T. C. 998 (1950). It is interesting to note that the
respondent first selected only one store, the Pittsburgh branch, as representative of all branch
stores; after a conference with Commission accountants, however, the sample chosen was
three stores, Pittsburgh, Buffalo and St. Louis.
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answer the contention that "it is impractical to express highly definitive
standards of proof" in the cost justification area by suggesting that, "We
have never risen to the challenge presented by the due allowance pro-
viso."84 Mr. Warmack and others have embarked upon a Robinson-
Patman cost accounting study which ".. . will provide bases for definitely
establishing standards of proof and procedures for Robinson-Patman
costing which can effectively and successfully be applied . . . with rela-
tively little additional effort and expense."" While the lawyer is not
competent to make an absolute choice between the Taggart and Warmack
theories, he is naturally sympathetic to the latter's suggestions since the
lawyer's experience and training have shown him many instances of
extremely complicated situations which are regulated by detailed codes
and statutes. Mr. Warmack is not suggesting that a cost justification prob-
lem can be solved by "turning to the right page in the ledger." He is
suggesting, however, that standards of proof can be developed which will
be adequate for most situations in the cost defense area; he is suggesting
that procedures for Robinson-Patman costing can be developed to cover
most situations. The unique situation will always necessitate a special
adjudication, but this is not unfamiliar ground to the lawyer. It is
extremely difficult for the lawyer to believe that it is impossible to create
any uniform standards for cost justification. He cannot accept the con-
tention that proof for cost justification is doomed to a haphazard existence
or that sellers cannot know when they are obeying the law, and when
they are not. By and large, the lawyer's tendency is to agree with Mr.
Warmack: a detailed code for cost justification can be written; it just
hasn't been written.
In relation to Robinson-Patman accounting, the Report indicates
that good business management does not demand the extent of detail
or the continuity of records needed for instantaneous solution of the
problems presented under the Act. In the event of an FTC investigation,
a seller who decides to use the cost defense will always need special cost
studies. Yet, a "well-designed system of expense classification suitable for
cost control" can provide adequate information for business purposes and
simultaneously such a system can provide the raw material necessary for
special cost studies.
04 Warmack, Standards of Proof Re R-P Costing Procedures Are to be Established,
TRADE PRACrICE BULL. 2 (Nov. 1957).
65 Ibid at 7.
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In this respect, the Report seems to indicate that a seller should have
a cost analysis system which will allow the seller to feel secure in granting
discounts, etc. The crucial question, however, remains unanswered, to
wit, how detailed must such a knowledge of costs be? While it would
not have been possible to answer every unique problem, the Report could
have included several comprehensive examples to implement its sug-
gestion. Absent such examples, the reader is left with another broad
criterion which affords little practical- assistance.
When the Report talks about methods of cost analysis, it recognizes
two basic problems: (1) What can be done, on a day-to-day basis, to
indicate whether price differentials are greater than, or no greater than
cost differentials? (2) In the event of an FTC investigation, what addi-
tional steps will be necessitated to establish the cost defense and how
much more time, effort and money will necessarily be spent? The
Report answers these questions in rather cavalier fashion: since each
company is different in terms of internal organization, degree of integra-
tion, variety of products, complexity of trade channels, methods of sale
and delivery, range of size and functional status of customers, competitive
practices, and many other features of business operation, each business
must determine for itself how far it must go toward providing current
data and how much must be left for special studies.
In its discussion of direct and indirect costs,6 the Report does little
more than point up the problems. When costs are incurred separately
for any one product, one customer, or one group of customers, these are
direct costs which are easily assigned to the product, customer or customer
group for which they were incurred. For example, a manufacturer sells
two products, X and Y; the seller advertises only product X, therefore,
all advertising expense is assigned to product X. When costs are jointly
incurred, i. e., when they are incurred for two or more products, cus-
tomers, or customer groups, these are indirect costs which must be
allocated before total costs for any given category can be ascertained.
A simple example, not found in the Report, would make this clearer:
seller X sells products A and B; from his ordinary books of account he
knows that he has spent $10,000 in advertising both products; he has
spent $5000 in delivering both products; his salesmen sell both products
and selling expenses amounted to $30,000. All of these costs were
incurred jointly, i. e.,' they were incurred in the sale of both products.
66 Report, 12.
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These costs are not readily assignable to products, customers or customer
groups. The best way of ascertaining that each product, customer, or
group of customers bears its fair share of these indirect or joint costs is
to use functional cost groups and allocate the costs in such groups among
products and among customers." Except for certain "purely illustrative"
examples contained in the appendix to the Report, the effort of the
Advisory Committee does not give the reader any guidance as to the
very difficult problems concerned with choosing acceptable bases of
allocation 8 so that the indirect costs can be allocated in such a manner
that they will be acceptable to the Commission in an FTC proceeding or
to a court in a private treble damage action.
Part IV of the Report contains recommendations for certain organi-
zational and procedural changes by the Commission in its administration
of the cost proviso. 9 While some of the suggestions seem sound,"° they
67 Costs are placed into functional cost groups by classifying costs according to their
purpose and not according to their nature, as they are when recorded in the ordinary books
of account. Thus, the question is asked, for what purpose or function was a particular cost
incurred. Only in this way is it possible to allocate costs to products, customers and/or
customer groups to ascertain that each product, customer or customer group bears its fair
share of the cost incurred to perform each function.
68 In order to allocate costs to products, customers and customer groups, an appropriate
basis of allocation must be chosen. For example, a firm sells two products, X and Y; the
cost incurred to perform the warehousing function for both products is $5000. In order to
ascertain how much of that $5000 is allocable to product X, a suitable basis of allocation
might be the space factor, i. e., the space occupied by product X. If it is determined that
product X occupied 40% of the warehousing space, $2000 of the total $5000 is attributable
to product X. With each functional cost, (e. g., warehousing, selling, transportation, etc.,)
the cost analyst is interested in the portion of the total costs (incurred for the performance
of each function) attributable to product X because the Commission has alleged price
discrimination in sales of product X. After ascertaining the costs of performing each function
for product X, it then becomes necessary to spread these costs over the various customers or
customer groups. It then becomes possible to compare the costs of selling product X to the
various customers or classifications of cutomers to determine whether the cost differentials
manifested between each customer or customer group are equal to, greater than, or less than
price differentials between them. If the price differentials are greater than the cost differ-
entials, the attempt to use the cost defense has failed. Thus, bases of allocation must be
chosen to spread total functional costs over products, and they must be chosen to spread the
functional costs for product X over customers or groups of customers. It is possible that
some of the bases chosen for allocation to products will be appropriate to allocate costs to
customers or customer groups.69 Report, 15.
70 The Report recommends that an Accounting Adviser post be created. Such account-
ing adviser would assist the Commission on accounting matters arising informally under the
Act; he would assist in the preparation of continuing accounting opinions and would par-
ticipate in adversary proceedings subject to call as an expert witness by the hearing examiner,
on his own motion, or on the motion of either party. The hearing examiner, of course,
would not be bound by the testimony of the adviser. Another sound suggestion in the
Report relates to the establishment of detailed pre-trial techniques to eliminate surprise and
tactical advantages and to frame the issues more precisely.
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are obviously oversanguine in that they do not take account of the fact
that the FTC is, at the present time, a fund-starved agency and few of
the suggestions in the Report are financially feasible.
Evaluation
Up to the present time, the Report has not been officially accepted
by the Commission, and there are no present indications that it will ever
be accepted as an official pronouncement of the principles of cost justi-
fication. There has also been a dearth of unofficial comment on the
Report. From the available material, which is admittedly sketchy, and
also from answers to certain questionnaires submitted to past respondents
by the author, the following evaluations are presented:
Businessmen
What degree of assistance does the Report afford the business
community?
"We are familiar with the 'Taggart Report' but believe it is so generalized
as to be of little assistance or practical value, although it sets up some
excellent common-sense rules of reason, refers approvingly to the aggregating
of costs, and in general favors the good faith approach to cost studies."7 1
"The report of the Advisory Committee is useful as a general frame of refer-
ence, but does not have any definitive answers to particular problems." 7 2
"I am afraid that the Taggart Report would be of little or no value in
gathering material for presenting a cost justification defense, other than to
serve as a check-list of possible approaches."73
There are, of course, those who have become so convinced of the
impossibility of cost justification that they ". . . did not even bother to
read the 'Taggart Report.' "' These comments emanate from businessmen
or their counsel, each of whom has been involved in at least one cost
justification proceeding. They are, therefore, cognizant of the problems
of the cost defense and could be expected to appraise the Report in the
light of their cost justification experience.
Lawyers
The only thorough law review article which appraises the Report
does so in the following manner:
"The Advisory Committee with its excellent personnel has made a contribu-
71 Letter from Lester A. Hamburg, President of Hamburg Bros., Inc., (a recent re-
spondent in FTC proceeding involving cost justification), Dec. 8, 1958.
72 Letter from John R. Henry, General Counsel, American Can Co., January 8, 1959.
73 Letter from R. H. Frick, Standard Oil of Indiana, Dec. 2, 1958.
74 Letter from L. M. McBride, counsel for Morton Salt Co., Jan. 7, 1959.
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tion of value. It is not the contribution some were led to believe would
result, which would have been of a more technical and detailed nature." 75
A short but nevertheless penetrating analysis of the Report suggests
that it
is a statement of broad proposals which would require clarifying illus-
trations and citations to enable the average reader to understand it.... In no
sense does the report come up to . . .expectations or to the stated purposes
for which the Committee was created."76
Accountants
Mr. William Warmack suggests:
"Wide generalizations such as those included in the report may have proved
helpful in [the) early days, but there is no great need for them at the
present time. They gave way long ago to specific and authoritative informa-
tion on R-P costing requirements based on actual experience and case
decisions. And there is now a wealth of such information built up over the
past twenty years." 77
Conclusion
The principles stated in the Advisory Committee Report are
analagous to broad "canons of construction." When applied to concrete
situations, their vagueness and ambiguity detract substantially from their
value.
In mitigation of this indictment, it must be stated that the members
of the Advisory Committee performed this endeavor without compensa-
tion except that which came as reimbursement for traveling expenses,
etc. The fact that their normal activity prolonged the preparation of the
Report is evidenced by the time taken in preparation, some twenty-seven
months.
By and large, what is to be lamented most is the over-summarization
of material which the members of the Committee developed.' Perhaps
if more of the detailed material were included in the Report, many of
the criticisms of generality would be rebutted.
As the Report now stands, it must be characterized as a failure in
relation to any of the stated purposes found therein. There is nothing
in the first four years of its early life to rebut this appraisal.
75 Op. cit. supra, n. 31 at 424.7 6 Op. cit. supra, n. 16.
77 Warmack, Facts Not Theories Needed to Meet R-P Costing Requirements, TRADE
PRACrIcE BULL., 1956.
78 The Report itself states that it is a summary of material developed by the members
of the Advisory Committee.
